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Encountering Foucault in lifelong learning 
Gert Biesta 
 
“The only important problem is what happens on the ground.” 
(Foucault 1991a, p.83) 
 
The chapters in this book stage a range of different encounters with the work of 
Michel Foucault. Through them we not only gain a better understanding of the 
potential of Foucault’s work. At the same time the chapters shed a different light on 
policies and practices of lifelong learning. There is, therefore, a double encounter in 
this book: we encounter Foucault in lifelong learning and we encounter lifelong 
learning through the eyes of Foucault. Both encounters are, of course, important. 
Whereas the stated purpose of this book is to gain a new and different understanding 
of lifelong learning and, through this, to contribute to a re-conceptualisation of 
lifelong learning, the book also functions as a ‘test’ of Foucault’s ideas. It reveals 
strengths and weaknesses of using Foucault to analyse and understand educational 
practices and processes and the wider strategies and techniques of governing in late-
modern, neo-liberal societies. For this final chapter this raises two questions: What 
has this book achieved in understanding and conceptualising lifelong learning 
differently? And what does this tell us about the significance of Foucault’s work for 
this particular endeavour? To address these questions I will, in this final chapter, 
focus on three issues: (1) the nature of Foucauldian analysis; (2) the question of 
normativity; and (3) the opportunities for change. In what follows I will first try to 
characterise the main thrust of the chapters against the background of Foucault’s ideas 
on governmentality and power. I will then focus on what I see as one of the most 
interesting dimensions of this book, viz., the question as to what follows from 
Foucauldian analysis. I will first characterise how the different authors answer this 
question. I will then discuss what I see as the specific ‘nature’ of Foucauldian 
analysis, particularly with respect to the relationship between power and knowledge. 
This will provide the background for my reflections on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the contributions in this book which, finally, will bring me back to the question of 
normativity in Foucauldian analysis and the question as to how such analysis can 
support change. 
 
The Governmentality of Lifelong Learning 
What unites the chapters in this book is that they all analyse policies and practices of 
lifelong learning with reference to the idea of ‘governmentality.’ ‘Governmentality’ – 
a neologism introduced by Foucault to refer to ‘governmental rationality’ (see Gordon 
1999, p.1; Foucault 1991b) – refers “to the structures of power by which conduct is 
organised, and by which governance is aligned with the self-organising capacities of 
individual subjects” (Olssen this volume, p.1[ms]). What Foucault was after with the 
idea of governmentality was an understanding of practices of governing – and more 
generally an understanding of the ‘exercise’ of power – which was not based on the 
idea of power as coercion or violence. Foucault argued that we should see power as a 
relationship, but not simply as “a relationship between partners,” but rather as “a way 
in which certain actions modify others” (Foucault 1982, p.219). 
 
 In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of 
action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it 
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acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or 
on those which may arise in the present or the future. (ibid., p.220) 
 
A relationship of violence “forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it 
closes the door on all possibilities” (ibid.). A power relationship, on the other hand, 
“can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are indispensable,” 
namely that the one over whom power is exercised “be thoroughly recognized and 
maintained to the very end as a person who acts” and that, “faced with a relationship 
of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions 
may open up” (ibid.). To govern, therefore, means “to structure the possible field of 
action of others” (ibid., p.221) which, in turn, implies that power as a mode of action 
upon the actions of others does not do away with freedom but rather presupposes it. 
“Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.” (ibid.) 
 
This way of understanding power allows for a new kind of analysis of practices of 
governing, an analysis which does not simply look at the activities of those ‘in power’ 
and the ways in which they force others into particular actions, but which rather 
focuses on the ways in which power ‘circulates’ in relationships and social networks 
and on how the circulation of power is the result of what free subjects do to others 
and to themselves, not its precondition. This is why Foucault emphasised that the 
analysis of power relations within a society “cannot be reduced to the study of a series 
of institutions, not even to the study of all those institutions which would merit the 
name ‘political’” (ibid., p.224). The reason for this is that power relations “are rooted 
in the system of social networks” (ibid.). This means that we shouldn’t simply look 
for those who ‘steer’ those networks; it is rather that a particular configuration puts 
some in the steering position or gives the impression that some are ‘in control.’ The 
actual workings of power are thus quite messy. As Foucault put it: “The forms and the 
specific situations of the government of men by one another in a given society are 
multiple; they are superimposed, they cross, impose their own limits, sometimes 
cancel one another out, sometimes reinforce one another.” (ibid.) This is not to say 
that the state is no longer important or no longer powerful. But this is not because 
power in some original form belongs to the state, but “because power relations have 
come more and more under state control (although this state control has not taken the 
same form in pedagogical, judicial, economic, or family systems)” (ibid.). This is 
what Foucault referred to as the governmentalization of the state (see Foucault 1991b, 
p.103; see also the contribution by Simons and Masschelein in this volume). 
 
Whereas the analysis of power and of practices of governing plays a crucial role in 
Foucault’s work, he has made it clear that ultimately “it is not power, but the subject, 
which is the general theme of my research” (Foucault 1982, p.209; see also Biesta 
1998a). For Foucault, the point is not simply to find an answer to the question how 
power is exercised and what happens when individuals exert power over others and 
over themselves. Foucault seeks to answer these questions because he wants to 
understand how particular subjectivities, particular ways of being, are ‘produced’ 
through these processes and, also, how other subjectivities and identities are made 
difficult or impossible. Whereas in his earlier analyses Foucault explored this through 
the examination of disciplinary power and pastoral power, governmentality, as Nicoll 
and Fejes make clear in the introduction, combines the two perspectives in the study 
of the rationality of governing, thus foregrounding the active contributions individuals 
make to the circulation of power relationships and have to make in order for particular 
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modes of governing to become possible. As Edwards in his chapter explains, 
governing “does not so much determine people’s subjectivities, but rather elicits, 
fosters, promotes and attributes [them]” (Edwards, this volume, p.5[ms]). Or, in the 
words of Dean: “to analyze government is to analyze those practices that try and 
shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, 
wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Dean 1999, p.12). This line of 
thought is particularly prominent in the Foucauldian analysis of the governmental 
rationality of neo-liberalism in which the self is configured as an ‘entrepreneurial self’ 
or an ‘entrepreneur of the self.’ The entrepreneurial self, as we can read in the chapter 
by Simons and Masschelein, is not simply – or perhaps we should say: not only – a 
free subject; the entrepreneurial self is also a governable subject, that is, a subject that 
is of “strategic importance for advanced liberal governments” (Simons & 
Masschelein, this volume, p.7[ms]). 
 
Against this background it is now possible to characterise the contributions in this 
book in a more precise manner. What all the authors in their own way show is that 
lifelong learning is not a ‘natural’ phenomenon that exists outside of the circulation of 
power and beyond the influence of neo-liberal governmentality, but that it is rather 
closely tied up with the neo-liberal governmentality. The chapters show the different 
ways in which the field of action of lifelong learning is structured. The point of 
making this visible is not only to show “the structures of power by which conduct is 
organised” (Olssen, this volume); it is also to reveal the ways in which “governance is 
aligned with the self-organising capacities of individual subjects” (ibid.). The chapters 
show, in other words, that the governmentality of lifelong learning as it manifests 
itself in contemporary neo-liberal societies, calls forth a particular kind of subjectivity 
called the ‘lifelong learner.’ Lifelong learners are not only condemned, so we might 
say, to a never-ending life of learning. Under the neo-liberal governmentality of 
lifelong learning, lifelong learners have also become increasingly responsible for their 
own learning. The chapters thus show how the neo-liberal governmentality of lifelong 
learning has turned learning from a right into a duty (see Biesta 2006). This reveals 
that the neo-liberal governmentality of lifelong learning is bound up with particular 
power relationships and particular ways of being, and it is in this ‘assemblage’ that we 
can find what Simons and Masschelein refer to as the governmentalization of learning 
itself. 
 
The Consequences of Foucault 
Whereas most of the chapters in this book follow a similar – though definitely not 
identical – pattern in their analyses of the governmentality of lifelong learning, the 
conclusions they draw from their analyses are quite different. Olssen suggests, for 
example, that a Foucauldian analysis should be complemented with a normative 
argument which would allow us to ‘safeguard learning from neoliberal appropriation.’ 
He argues for a democratic conception of lifelong learning and suggests that in order 
to bring this about we need “a theory of learning that teaches how powers are formed, 
harnessed and sustained, how compositions are brought into being,  or avoided, how 
encounters are influenced and how institutional and collective politics are negotiated 
productively” (Olssen, this volume, p.9[ms]). Edwards takes a more ‘modest’ 
approach, highlighting the fact that “attempts to mobilize lifelong learning in 
particular ways” will never be ‘perfect’ since they will always be subject “to diverse 
and unexpected shifts and changes” (Edwards, this volume, p.10[ms]). But he also 
calls for a more active decentering of the ‘regime of truth’ of lifelong learning “in 
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order that we can look again at the meanings it has, and the work it does” (ibid.). 
Simons and Masschelein take, in a sense, a more radical approach in that they argue 
for the need to reject learning altogether – ‘freeing ourselves from learning’ as they 
call it. Their reason for this is that as long as we try to ‘improve’ learning itself we 
remain caught up in the “current governmental regime” of which learning is part 
(Simons & Masschelein, this volume, p.10[ms]). 
 
Whereas the aforementioned authors draw explicit implications and recommendations 
from their analyses, Olsson and Petersson seem to refrain from doing so. They present 
their analysis without drawing any conclusions from it and seem to want to leave it to 
the reader to do this. Popkewitz is slightly more explicit about the way in which his 
analyses might be used in that he argues that a historicizing analysis as the one he 
provides in his chapter might help to ‘unthink’ particular fixed oppositions and thus 
might lead to different ways of thinking and being. Fejes takes a similar approach in 
his attempt to historicize the figure of the lifelong learner, but draws more explicit 
conclusions from his analysis by arguing that different ‘configurations’ of the lifelong 
learner all result in particular exclusions, sometimes even in the name of inclusion. He 
summons his readers to “question the narratives of lifelong learning and [to] try to 
understand what kinds of subjects are intended as the product” (Fejes, this volume, 
p.10[ms]). Fogde’s detailed analysis of the ways in which contemporary job search 
practices ‘regulate’ the subject in a particular way again remains on the side of 
analysis, without drawing any specific lessons. Like Edwards, Zackrisson and 
Assarsson emphasise the fact that the workings of power are never perfect. 
Participants in adult education use such education in ways that fit their own patterns 
of life, which makes it difficult to understand these processes as a one-sided exertion 
of power. They suggest that it is always possible “to act defiantly” (Zackrisson 
&Assarsson, this volume, p.8[ms]). Their optimistic conclusion therefore is that “the 
normalizing techniques of power not only produce obedient and predictable people 
but also revolutionary and unpredictable [ones]” (ibid.). 
 
The more descriptive analysis provided by Anderson, another example of an author 
whose analysis does not lead to any specific conclusions or recommendations, stands 
in stark contracts to the way in which Berglund draws conclusions from her research. 
Like Simons and Masschelein she is acutely aware of the fact that the ‘freedom of 
choice’ that can be found in the neo-liberal governmentality of lifelong learning is 
part and parcel of this governmentality and should therefore not simply be seen as a 
point from which resistance can emerge. As long as subjects do not become aware of 
the ways in which power/knowledge operates through these practices, they will be 
fooled into believing “that this freedom of choice opens up all subject positions 
equally” (Berglund, this volume, p.13[ms]). It thus “may mislead people to think that 
any life choice may be an equally possible and desired subject position” (ibid.). 
Berglund thus seems to suggest that an understanding of the workings of the neo-
liberal governmentality of lifelong learning might be a way to overcome or counter 
some of its power-effects. This way of thinking can also be found in Ahl’s 
contribution as she argues that the kind of analysis that she has conducted makes it 
possible to question what is considered to be normal and what is considered to be 
deviant. In this way, Ahl suggests, it can support the resistance of those who, from the 
dominant or ‘normal’ perspective appear as a problem. Nichol does something similar 
in her analysis of e-learning, in that she presents different ways to understand e-
learning and its implications for disciplines and subjectivities. Her conclusion is that 
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e-learning in itself does not determine a particular ‘use.’ Therefore, whether it will 
lead to more discipline or more freedom crucially depends on the uptake. The analysis 
itself can be seen as making readers – including those who use e-learning – aware of 
these different options. Solomon’s discussion, the last one in the row, shares most 
with those chapters which aim to analyse the neo-liberal governmentality without 
articulating any specific lessons or drawing any specific conclusions. 
 
When we look at the chapters in this way, that is, by focusing on the conclusions and 
recommendations that the authors draw from their analysis, we can roughly discern 
three different approaches. Some authors just present an analysis of policies and 
practices of lifelong learning, highlighting, for example, how such policies and 
practices call forth particular subjectivities and create particular subject positions, but 
they leave it to their readers to draw any conclusions from this. Others are more 
explicit in their conclusions and suggest more or less explicitly that Foucauldian 
analysis can help us to unveil the workings of power and that it is because of this can 
such analysis can help individuals to be less determined by power. They emphasise, in 
other words, the emancipatory potential of Foucault. A third group of authors is more 
reluctant to ‘translate’ their analyses into recommendations for action because they 
seem to acknowledge that Foucauldian analysis has implications for the very practice 
of analysis itself as well. (This is what Nicoll in her chapter refers to as the ‘reflexive 
difficulty’.) I am inclined to agree with the third group of authors because in my view 
Foucault has not only provided us with a different way to analyse power and 
governing; his work also implies a different understanding of what the analysis of 
power itself can achieve. This has everything to do with the way in which we 
understand the relationship between power and knowledge. ‘After’ Foucault, so I 
wish to suggest, we have to understand this relationship in a fundamentally different 
way than ‘before’ Foucault, and this has important implications for what Foucauldian 
analysis can achieve and how it might be utilised to effect change. In order to 
appreciate what the difference is that makes this difference, I need to say a little more 
about Foucault and (the) Enlightenment. 
 
Stop Making Sense? The Question of Method 
Many would argue that Foucault has helped us to understand the workings of power 
in a new and different way. At one level this is, of course, correct. But what 
complicates the matter is that for Foucault a better understanding of the workings of 
power does not automatically put us in a position where we can free ourselves from 
the impact of the workings of power. Foucault has explicitly rejected the idea that we 
can use knowledge to ‘combat’ power. He has rejected the Manichean foundations of 
the Enlightenment in that he has challenged the idea that power and knowledge are 
separate ‘entities’ and that emancipation consists in the ‘victory’ of knowledge over 
power (see Pels 1992). For Foucault power and knowledge always come together – 
something which is expressed in his notion of ‘power/knowledge’. This is why he has 
argued that we should abandon “a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that 
knowledge can only exist where the power relations are suspended” (Foucault 1975, 
p.27). This is not to say that change is no longer possible or that knowledge has 
become futile. But what it does signify is the end of the ‘innocence’ of knowledge, the 
end of the idea that knowledge is ‘pure’, ‘simple’ and uncontaminated by power and 
thus can be used to reveal how power operates. Foucault urges us to acknowledge that 
we are always operating within fields of power/knowledge – of power/knowledge 
against power/knowledge, not of power against knowledge or knowledge against 
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power. What is ‘new,’ therefore, about Foucault’s analysis of power – and hence 
should be taken into consideration in any Foucauldian analysis – is that he does not 
see this analysis as the way in which we can escape and overcome the workings of 
power (see also Biesta 1998b). 
 
Does this mean that for Foucault we live in an iron cage from which no escape is 
possible? Is it the case, as some of Foucault’s critics have argued, that his work has an 
“anaesthetizing effect” because the “implacable logic” of it leaves “no possible room 
for initiative” (Foucault 1991a, p.82)? These questions only make sense as long as we 
assume that it is possible to occupy a place outside of the system from which we can 
analyse and criticize the system. They only make sense, in other words, as long as we 
assume that knowledge is ‘outside’ of or ‘beyond’ power. But what Foucault has 
urged us to do, is precisely to move beyond this inside-outside thinking. There is, 
therefore, potential for action, change and critique in Foucault’s ‘universe,’ but it 
requires an approach that is distinctively different from the modern Enlightenment 
approach. According to Foucault it is true “that we have to give up hope of ever 
acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive 
knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits” (Foucault 1984, p.47). But 
this doesn’t mean that there is nothing to do. Foucault agrees with Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Kant that criticism “consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits” 
(Foucault 1984, p.45). But “if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits 
knowledge had to renounce transgressing, (…) the critical question today has to be 
turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the 
product of arbitrary constraints? (Foucault 1984, p.45) 
 
In some of his work Foucault has referred to this approach as ‘eventalization’ (see 
Foucault 1991a, p.76). Eventalization comes down to a ‘breach of self-evidence.’ “It 
means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a 
historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which 
imposes itself uniformly on all.” (ibid.). Rather than looking for a single explanation 
of particular ‘facts’ or ‘events,’ eventalization works “by constructing around the 
singular event ... a ‘polygon’ or rather a ‘polyhedron’ of intelligibility, the number of 
whose faces is not given in advance and can never properly be taken as finite” (ibid., 
p.77). Eventalization thus means to complicate and to pluralize our understanding of 
events, their elements, their relations and their domains of reference (see ibid.). 
Looked at it in this way, eventalization does, therefore, not result in a ‘deeper’ 
understanding, an understanding of underlying ‘structures’ or ‘causes’ and in this 
respect eventalization does not generate the kind of knowledge that will set us free 
from the workings of those structures or causes. But Foucault has been adamant that 
this does not mean that such analysis is without effect. What eventalization does not 
generate, so he has argued, is advice or guidelines or instructions as to what is to be 
done. But what it can bring about is a situation in which people “’no longer know 
what they do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to 
go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous” – and this effect is 
entirely intentional (ibid., p.84). Foucauldian analysis therefore doesn’t result in a 
deeper or more true understanding of how power works – it only tries to unsettle what 
is taken for granted – nor does it aim to produce recipes for action. This kind of 
analysis is therefore not meant to ‘solve’ problems, is not meant to gives ideas to 
reformers to make the world a better one. In relation to this, Foucault has emphasised 
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that this kind of knowledge is not meant for the ‘social workers’ or the ‘reformers’ but 
rather for the subjects who act. 
 
Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: 
this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those 
who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in 
processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have 
to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage of programming. It is a 
challenge directed to what is. (ibid., p.84) 
 
What Foucault is arguing for is not only a different ‘style’ of critique but also a 
different ‘audience’ for critique, not the ones who try to solve problems and make 
things better, but those who are struggling to make possible different ways of being 
and doing – which lies behind Foucault’s claim that in a sense “(t)he only important 
problem is what happens on the ground” (Foucault 1991a, p.83). What this entails is a 
“practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression” (Foucault 1984, 
p.45; emph. added). The critical practice of transgression is not meant to overcome 
limits (not in the least because limits are not only constraining but always also 
enabling; see Simmons 1995, p.69). Transgression rather is the practical and 
experimental ”illumination of limits” (see Foucault 1977, pp. 33-38; Boyne, 1990). 
 
Foucault’s rejection of the modern approach to Enlightenment, where emancipation is 
seen as the process in which we overcome the workings of power through our 
understanding of how power works, therefore does not mean the end of any critical 
work. It rather opens up a new domain for critique and a new critical ‘style’ or 
practice called ‘transgression.’ Transgression, understood as the experimental 
illumination of limits, can take the form of what I have elsewhere called a counter-
practice (see Biesta 1998b). Counter-practices should not be designed on the basis of 
the assumption that they will be better. What matters only is that counter-practices are 
different. The critical ‘work’ of counter-practices consists in showing (or proving, as 
Foucault would say) that the way things are, is only one (limited) possibility. Yet this 
tiny step is crucial, since it opens up the possibility “of no longer being, doing, or 
thinking what we are, do, or think” – and in precisely this sense “it is seeking to give a 
new impetus ... to the undefined work of freedom” (Foucault 1984, p.46). 
 
Encountering Foucault in Lifelong Learning 
As I have suggested above, there are roughly three ways in which the authors in this 
book approach Foucauldian analysis. Some just present an analysis of policies and 
practice of lifelong learning without drawing any particular conclusions or 
formulating any specific recommendations. Others present their analysis as a way to 
unveil the workings of power in the neo-liberal governmentality of lifelong learning 
and aim to use this understanding to indicate ways in which the effects of the 
workings of power can be resisted or overcome. The third group, as I have argued, 
shows more reluctance in formulating recommendations for change as they seem to be 
aware of some of the reflexive difficulties that follow from using Foucault. Against 
the background of what I have said in the previous section, I am now in a position to 
comment on these three different usages of Foucault in a more precise manner. Before 
I do so, I wish to emphasise that most chapters do not neatly fall within just one of the 
groups. In most cases authors rely on at least two of these approaches. My comments 
are therefore not aimed at particular chapters in this book, but focus on the different 
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approaches or strategies that can be discerned in the chapters. What they reveal, 
however, are distinctly different ways to use Foucault and conduct Foucauldian 
analysis. My point is, however, that there are tensions between some of the uses of 
Foucault and what I see as the specific character of Foucauldian analysis. 
 
With regards to the first group I am inclined to say that they only use ‘half’ of 
Foucault in their analyses. They use Foucault’s understanding of power and the 
product of subjectivities/subject-positions predominantly as a theory to describe and 
analyse policies and practices of lifelong learning. What is lacking in this approach is 
an awareness of the methodological aspects of Foucauldian analysis. As a result, the 
authors give the impression that their analyses have to be accepted as a true or 
accurate account of what is going on in the field of lifelong learning. Such an 
approach not only lacks the reflexivity Foucauldian analysis would call for. Because 
of the absence of specific recommendations it also remains unclear where these 
authors stand politically. It is, in other words, not clear what the normative agenda of 
these authors – if any – exactly is. 
 
This is not the case with the contributions in the second group where it is quite clear 
what the motivations for the engagement with Foucauldian analysis are. Here, the 
main impetus of Foucauldian analysis is to achieve an understanding of the workings 
of power that can help individuals to overcome some of the impact of the workings of 
power. Authors in this group thus clearly identify with an emancipatory agenda. But 
whereas the authors in this group are much more explicit about their motivations and, 
as a result of this, much more reflexive about both the content and the method of their 
analysis, the problem, as I see it, is that they combine a post-Foucauldian analysis 
with a pre-Foucauldian methodology. This is a tempting strategy, not in the least 
because the Foucauldian analysis of the neo-liberal governmentality of lifelong 
learning makes a lot of sense and to a certain extent even rings true and such insights 
might help individuals to do things differently. The problem here, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, is that it spurs individuals into action on the basis of what we might call a 
new ‘self-evidence,’ a new and better way to understand what is ‘really’ going on. 
Such an approach lacks reflexivity as well, because it is neither able to problematise 
the self-evidence that should lead to emancipation and freedom, nor is it able to 
acknowledge the extent to which such a strategy would itself rely on the operation of 
power, that is, on the structuring of the possible field of action of others on the basis 
of a certain self-evidence. 
 
This is where the third approach which I have discerned in the contributions to this 
book remains closer to Foucault, not only because they combine Foucauldian theory – 
a Foucauldian understanding of the workings of power and the constitutions of 
subjectivities and subject-positions – with a Foucauldian methodology, but also 
because in their analyses they aim to breach the self-evidence of particular practices 
and policies of lifelong learning without claiming to generate a deeper truth about 
what actually is going on. Such an approach is not without what we might call 
‘emancipatory effect.’ But it is first of all important to see that this is a different kind 
of emancipation; not an emancipation that tries to escape power but rather one that 
allows for a different power/knowledge constellation – a different way of being and 
doing. It is, therefore, not emancipation in the ‘traditional’ sense as liberation from 
power, but more something that is akin to what Foucault has so aptly referred to as the 
undefined work of freedom. It is also important to see that the emancipatory effect of 
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these kind of analyses is not based on the construction of a new self-evidence, but no 
the transgression of existing self-evidence in order to show that other subject-
positions are possible; subject-positions that, in a sense, are located outside of existing 
and predominant discourses and, in a sense, cannot be captured or articulated within 
them. This is very well captured in Ahl’s remarks on the ‘unmotivated adult’ where 
she shows that the person who does not want to study, and in this respect appears as 
‘unmotivated’ an ‘official perspective, actually has no problem and hence has no need 
for an explanatory theory or for a policy that does something about it. It is, as she 
writes, “when someone wants someone else to do something and this person does not, 
that the problem arises” (Ahl, this book, p.8[ms]).  
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have aimed to provide a perspective on the contributions in this book. 
I have argued that Foucauldian analysis should not only be characterised by a usage of 
Foucault’s theories of power and subjectivity, but should also be informed by his 
ideas on method and methodology because it is there that, in my view, has made a 
major intervention in modern philosophy. I have suggested that some of the 
contributions in this book predominantly focus on Foucault’s theories. Others display 
an awareness of methodological issues, particularly in relation to the question as to 
what can be ‘done’ with or on the basis of Foucauldian analysis. Whereas some of the 
latter approaches give an answer to this question through the adoption of a ‘pre-
Foucauldian’ framework – relying upon a modern understanding of emancipation and 
Enlightenment – other contributions have been more successful in combining a 
Foucauldian approach at the level of both content and method. I wish to emphasises, 
however, that most of chapters combine elements of these three approaches, which 
means the distinctions I have introduced run through the chapters rather than that they 
organise the chapters in clear groupings. My comments are, therefore, mainly 
intended as a reading guide, but I leave it to the readers to judge to what extent they 
feel that the distinctions I have introduced are helpful in their own encounter with 
Foucault in lifelong learning. 
 
The chapters in this book do indeed provide a different way to understand aspects of 
the policies and practices of lifelong learning in contemporary neo-liberal societies. 
They also show the fruitfulness of a Foucauldian approach, although I have argued 
that a consistent use of Foucault in the encounter with lifelong learning is more 
difficult than it may seem, not in the least because Foucault urges us to resist our 
‘modern’ inclinations to come up with better understandings, solutions and plans for 
action. What Foucault asks us to do is first and foremost to breach self-evidence as 
this opens up opportunities for doing and being differently. Many of the chapters in 
this book are successful in questioning the self-evidence of lifelong learning even up 
to the point where the self-evidence of learning itself is called into question. In this 
respect the chapters help us to de-naturalise – or eventalize, as Foucault would call it 
– lifelong learning.  
 
Who is to benefit from all this? Again, Foucault helps us to resist the temptation to 
assume that analysis should lead to suggestions for policy and practice, to suggestions 
for improvement and the solution of problems. As some of the chapters in this book 
show, what is a problem for policy makers is not at all a problem ‘on the ground’ and 
to make this visible can help those ‘on the ground’ to resist adopting the problem-
perspective of policy makers. This is not, as I have argued, a strategy that allows them 
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to escape the workings of power. But it does provide opportunities for different ways 
of doing and being and thus can provide support for resisting or even refusing 
particular subjectivities or subject-positions. It is important to bear in mind, however, 
that contrary to what seems to be the emphasis in Foucault, it can also provide support 
for the adoption of particular subjectivities and subject-positions, particularly where 
individuals come to the conclusion that the adoption of such positions might well be 
beneficial to them. This requires judgement, and it is important to see that such 
judgements cannot be made in the abstract or at the level of theory; they have to be 
made ‘on the ground’ as well. Whether we adopt or reject the subject-position of the 
lifelong learning is therefore, at the end of the day, open to us. What the contributions 
in this book have helped to make visible is that there is at least this choice. In this 
respect the chapters have made an important ‘opening’ in the policies and practices of 
lifelong learning. 
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